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The paper develops a theoretical model showing a mutual relationship be-
tween corruption and capital account restrictions. According to the model,
higher corruption induces stricter restrictions and vice versa. We test the
model using panel data for 112 countries over the period 1984–2002 and find
that corruption and restrictions are indeed mutually determined. Estimating
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capitalaccount.Theempiricalrelationshipis,however,notcompletelyrobust.
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According to the World Bank (2001),corruption is the “single greatest obsta-
cle to economic and social development”;this holds even for developed coun-
tries.The Bank estimates that more than US-$ 1 trillion is paid in bribes each
year. Thus, corruption represents one of the major “taxes” on economic
agents.1 Consequently,corruption has won increasing interest in the econom-
ics literature.
Capital controls,in turn,are also widespread in the world,mainly outside the
Western World.Their major purpose is to reach higher tax revenue and to re-
duce the danger of financial and bank crises.Their incidence increased mainly
after the experiences of economic crises in the 1990th.In this context,some in-
stitutions and politicians,mainly in Europe,have proposed to introduce capi-
tal controls in the Western World, for instance the Tobin tax, to mitigate the
“negative”effects of globalisation.
The relationship between corruption and capital flows has frequently been in-
vestigated without,however,providing consistent results.While some studies
show that corruption reduces capital imports (Lambsdorff 2002; Drabek,
Payne 2001; Smarzynska, Wei 2000; Wei 1999), others do not find any signifi-
cant correlation (Alesina,Weder 1999;Wheeler,Mody 1992).
One channel by which corruption could affect capital flows is via restrictions
on the capital account.2 As Bai/Wei (2001) argue, more corrupt countries are
morelikelytoimposecapitalcontrolsbecausecorruptionreducesthegovern-
ments’ ability to collect tax revenue. In order to raise revenue, politicians
therefore rely on capital controls. According to Edwards (1999), DeLong/
Eichengreen(2002),El-Shagi(2005),however,capitalcontrolsmaybreedcor-
ruption. If controls exist, individuals try to mitigate the burdens by offering
side payments and bribes. As one example, Shleifer/Vishny (1993) show that
theimpositionofcapitalcontrolseasescollectingbribes;hencetheimplemen-
tation of such controls induces corruption.3 Combining the two lines of argu-
mentation, thus, there seems to be a mutual relationship between corruption
and capital account restrictions.
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1 Dreher/Herzfeld (2005) provide a recent survey. See also the information provided by the
World Bank (2001).
2 In light of the “efficient grease hypothesis”,corruption can,per se, not be considered as “good”
or “bad”. Wei (1999), however, finds no evidence for the “efficient grease hypothesis”; he notes
that corruption even bears additional burdens.According to estimates of Dreher et al.(2004),the
losses in per capita GDP due to corruption are substantial.This is especially true in sub-Saharan
Africa.
3 The same is true for implementing “red tape” or big-sized businesses (being in nature for the
publiclesstransparentthansmallerones).Saha(2001)presentsaprincipal-agentapproachwhere
agents entitled to receive subsidy can pay bribes to officials to reduce “red tape”.Weanalyzethismutualrelationshipinatwo-periodmodelandprovideempir-
ical evidence. The model focuses on a small open economy with a fixed ex-
change rate. A domestic representative household maximizes utility in pe-
riod 1 deciding how much to consume and save today. A representative firm
produces output using capital of domestic and foreign investors.The domestic
government levies capital taxes on domestic and foreign investments. Since
foreign investments are more difficult to monitor, they cause tax revenue
losses that are fought by capital account restrictions.This capital control may
cause the domestic interest rate to dissociate itself from the level of the world
market. If it falls short, foreign investors leave the country and the higher re-
turns of foreign investments generate incentives for domestic households to
bribe public servants monitoring the capital account restrictions. Corruption,
in turn, reduces tax revenues and the government has to strengthen capital
controls. Hence, the degree of corruption and the degree of capital controls
determine themselves simultaneously.
However,capitalflightofforeigninvestorstendstoincreasedomesticinterest
rates. Therefore, if the additional capital supply of the domestic household,
caused by the controls,is lower than total capital supply of foreigners,the do-
mestic level of interest will be unaffected in our model. Consequently, no in-
centive for corruption would arise.
The model is extended by examining further determinants of corruption and
controls and transformed into an econometric model that we test empirically.
We analyze (Granger)-causality and estimate corruption and controls simul-
taneously.We find that corruption and capital account restrictions are indeed
mutually determined. However, the empirical relation between restrictions
and corruption is not completely robust.
2. Basic Model
Consider a 2-period model with a small open economy. The society of this
economy consists of four types of representative agents:private investors,en-
trepreneurs,public servants and the government.Our aim is to analyze the re-
lationship between capital account restrictions and corruption.Directly,capi-
tal account restrictions only affect capitalists’ income. Hence, only capitalists
have an incentive to conspire with public servants to circumvent restrictions
by paying bribes.(For simplicity we exclude “labor”from the analysis.) As we
consider a small domestic economy,the interest rate of the world market,de-
noted by r,is exogenous.Capital income is taxed.
The Intriguing Nexus between Corruption and Capital Account Restrictions 52.1 The Representative Household: Capital Taxes but no Capital Control
TherepresentativehouseholdisendowedwithwealthW.Thehouseholdmax-
imizes utility subject to its budget constraint. The two-period’s net present
value of wealth is given by W plus the discounted value of the net returns on
firstperiod’ssavings.Dependingontimepreference,thehouseholddecidesto
consume some part of W in the first period,c1,and saves the rest,i.e.savings S
are given by SWc =− 1.The savings are distributed on domestic wealth forms
(like bonds),denoted by D,and on foreign wealth forms,denoted by F.Inpe-
riod 2,these savings plus the returns are consumed;second period’s consump-
tion is denoted by c2 . We use c1 as numéraire. The consumption price in pe-
riod 2 is given by p2 .There is no inflation and thus p2 is equal to the discount
rate.



































to ensure a unique interior household’s optimum.
Wedenotethedomesticinterestratebyrd.Thecurrencyexchangerateineach
period t is credibly fixed at level one.Domestic and foreign bonds are perfect
substitutes. Let capital be completely mobile between inland and abroad.
Therefore,it holds that rr d = .Moreover,independent of where capital returns
areearned,taxrateτhastobepaidtothestateperunitofcapitalreturn.4Thus
the interest parity remains to hold,despite taxation.
The household’s decision problem then is
(1) max ( , ) . .
{,, } ccS uc c st W p R S S c p c
12
12 2 1 2 2 +⋅⋅ − ≥ +⋅
τ
with R
τ representing the world market net gross return per investment unit,
i.e.Rr
τ τ ≡+ − 11 () ; domestic gross return is denoted by Rr dd
τ τ ≡+ − 11 () . From
the first order condition for S we arrive at pR 2 1 = /
τ.From the conditions for
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4 It is common that all residents of a country have to pay capital income taxes with the sum of all





















the world market and the tax rate.The marginal rate of substitution between
c1 and c2 in the optimum is equal toR
τ,so that the time preference is harmo-
nizedwiththe“exchangerate”betweentoday’sandtomorrow’sconsumption,
given by the world capital market.
2.2 The Representative Domestic Firm
Therepresentativefirmisownedbytherepresentativehousehold.5Inthefirst
period, the firm produces the economy’s output y. In period 2, the firm is
closed and the output and the remaining stock of capital is consumed by the
ownersofthefirm.Theonlyinputiscapital,labeledK.Thetechnologyisgiven















0 to hold.There is no depreciation of capital.
The firm finances its capital input by bonds or credit.Simplifying,it has to pay
the domestic interest rate rd independent of the type of financing.At the end
of the first period,capital is repaid.Obviously,as long as the domestic interest
rate rd is below the world market’s level r both domestic and foreign house-
holdswanttoinvestsolelyintheworldmarket(arbitrageequilibrium).Wede-
note capital stemming from the inland by Kd and the foreign capital by K f .If
inlandresidents,incontrasttoforeigninvestors,arerestrictedintheirpossibil-
ities to invest abroad, e.g. if capital controls exist, the domestic interest rate





















with Krr fd (, ) being the capital supply of foreigners and Krr dd (, ) domestic
supply of capital,respectively,given world market rate r and domestic interest
rate rd. In our model, Krr dd (, ) corresponds with the domestic savings of the
representative household,which we denoted by D.Profit maximization is de-
scribed by:
max ( ) ( )
{} K d FK r K −+ 1 .
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5 Cf.the one-consumer,one-producer economy of chapter 15.C in Mas-Colell et al.(1995).We obtain the common optimum condition:
(3) FK r R dd '( ) . =+ = 1
Hence,irrespectiveoforigin,capitalispaidbymarginaldomesticproductivity.
DuetoperfectcompetitionitholdsthatFK r K d ()( ) =+ 1 .Therefore,theoutput
fully accrues to the investors. The representative household yields
()() 11 += + rK rD dd dvia gross capital returns in period 2 (pre-tax returns).
We assumed the Inada conditions to hold. Hence, domestic investment is ini-
tially advantageous. Then, in the course of a rising K, productivity FK '( )de-
clines until RR d = . Given foreign capital K f , this determines the part of sav-
ings invested in the inland.The rest of the savings are invested abroad.
Attheendofthissection,weprovideaspecificexample.Wedenotetheresult-
ing optimal levels of the decision variables in this no-capital-controls-scenario
by( , ,,,, ) ccSDFr
nc nc nc nc nc
d
nc
12 .The arbitrage equilibrium forces rr d
nc = .
2.3 The Domestic Government: Capital Account Restrictions
We now turn to the introduction of capital controls by the government.Capi-
tal control programs were and still are widespread (e.g. Asiendu, Lien 2003).
In the 1960th, during the system of Bretton Woods, the U.S. government used
an interest equalization tax and a foreign credit restrain program to stem U.S.
capital outflows.While the former reduced the return on foreign portfolio in-
vestments,the latter directly limited the outflow of domestic capital (Branson
1989: 418, 419). Therefore, capital controls can be classified into two catego-
ries:direct and indirect controls (Asiendu,Lien 2003:480).The annual report
ontheExchangeRateandMonetaryArrangementsoftheIMFshowsthatcap-
italcontrolsareespeciallywidespreadinSub-SaharanAfrica,andthatrestric-
tions have been tightened in East Asia in the aftermath of the Asian Financial
Crisis.Themostutilizedtypeofcontrolinthe1990thwasrestrictionsoncapital
account transactions. Hence, we will focus on direct capital controls in our
analysis.
The reasons for the establishment of capital controls can be manifold (e.g.
Milesi-Ferretti 1998):6 they may increase the independence of monetary pol-
icy and promote foreign currency reserves,limit capital flight and may help to
redistributefromcapitaltolabor.Moreover,thedifficultyofeffectivebanking
regulation creates an argument for capital controls, as a second-best solution
to the existence of distorted incentives in the banking system. Additionally,
capitalcontrolscanbeusedtoprotectunderdevelopedfinancialmarketsfrom
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6 See also Alfaro (2001) for a political economy and Stockman/Hernandez (1988) for a general
equilibrium analysis.foreigncompetition,andtoallowsmalldomesticfirmstogrowtowardtheeffi-
cient scale that they need to compete in the world market (infant industry ar-
gument; Neely 1999). Outside times of balance-of-payments crisis, however,
the main reason for their existence seems to be tax considerations (Bai, Wei
2001;Bartoli,Drazen 1997).
Especially in developing countries,income taxes flow only weakly,mainly for
reasons of missing infrastructure and administration in rural areas.The major
part of the tax revenue is therefore collected in “hot spots”like big towns.As
material capital incomes flow only to some smaller fraction of the population,
and mostly in exactly these hot spots,they are easier to monitor.Capital taxes
are therefore a popular instrument to collect taxes.7 Although capital income
abroad is treated just like its domestic counter-part, the government cannot
monitorforeigninvestmentsasgoodasdomesticinvestments.Moreover,capi-
tal is much more mobile than labor and strict taxation leads to capital flight.
Hence,alargepartofpossibletaxrevenuesareneverrealized.Therefore,cap-
ital controls are introduced to reduce the size of opaque foreign investments,
to limit potential capital flight and thereby to increase tax revenue.
Letusdenotetheaveragepartoftheforeigninvestmentthatisnotreportedto
the domestic revenue office by σ. We neglect all forms of taxes other than
those on capital return. The effective tax base is given by rD r F d ⋅+−⋅ ⋅ () 1 σ .
Suppose the government’s (planned) expenditures step over the tax revenue,
given by Tr D F
nc nc nc =⋅⋅ + − ⋅ τσ (( ) ) 1 . The government hence introduces a di-
rectcapitalaccountrestriction:thelevelofallowedforeigninvestmentofresi-
dents is restricted to FF ≤ .8,9 The level of this capital account restriction is
chosen such that it reduces the tax lossesτσ ⋅⋅⋅ rFso strong that the tax reve-
nue suffices to finance the planned expenditures,given by E.
However, capital account restrictions may bear corruption, whereby foreign
investments of size x, beyond threshold F, are enabled. Therefore, tax reve-
nues are reduced byτσ ⋅⋅⋅ rx via corruption.Burgess/Stern (1993:765),for in-
stance, state that problems like corruption are of considerable importance in
the context of the government’s resources. Thus, the government has to take
into account this trade-off between capital account restrictions and corrup-
tion. Moreover, we have to include the fact that the domestic interest rate
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7 For a discussion of taxation issues in developing countries see Burgess/Stern (1993).
8 Bartolini/Drazen (1997) report that real-world controls are typically asymmetric, i.e., they are
stricter either on inflows or (more frequently) on outflows, as in our model. Following their ap-
proach, we do not distinguish between restrictions on short-term flows and those on long-term
flows.However,we distinguish between restrictions on residents and non-residents.
9 Untilthe1980thcomparablerestrictionscouldbefound,forinstance,inItaly,NewZealand,and
Spain;in the 1970th,such controls were practiced in Uruguay (Bartolini,Drazen 1997: section I).
As mentioned,in the 1960th,the U.S.A.also levied direct restraints on capital outflows.rd mayuncouplefromtheinternationalrater,ifcapitalaccountrestrictionsex-
ist. We assume that the government observes the current level of x, but it ne-
glects equilibrium effects of its policy. Therefore, the government solves the
following objective function in each period for F:
(4) () Er D r F x d =⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅⋅ + τσ () ( ) 1 .
In the period of the introduction of the control, rd can be substituted by r.
However, if we consider a period in which controls already exist, we have to
distinguishthetwolevels.Supposethedomesticrepresentativehouseholdhas
topayabribeofsizebperunitofillegalforeigninvestmenttothecivilservant
that monitors the capital control. Then, we can state that




































Accordingly, we find that ∂∂ Fx b /( ) =− + < 10 , i.e., more corruption causes a
stricter capital account restriction FF ≤ .
Such an approach might describe a government’s policy in real world, but it
neglects the additional effects on the domestic interest rate, and thus on cor-
ruption and savings. A stricter capital control may decrease the domestic in-
terest rate and thus the tax base,which lowers the tax revenue.Hence,such a
policy may not be time-consistent.Then,the targeted revenue will not be real-
ized.Wecallthisscenariotheboundedrationalitycase.10Theeffectsofthepol-
icy on the domestic interest rate, however, should be accounted for.11 Ap-














10 Axel Dreher and Lars Siemers
10 Boundedrationalityinthesenseofneglectingequilibriumeffectshavebeenanalyzedbroadly
in the recent literature, e.g. Beilharz, Gersbach (2004); Drazen (2000), Chapter 10; Gersbach,
Schniewind(2001);Romer(2003);Saint-Paul(2000).Forthegeneraldebateonboundedrational-
ity see Rubinstein (1998) or Sargent (1993).
11 The government might consider decreasing domestic interest rates as something positive be-
cause it generates cheap money and more nominal revenue and lower debt cost by inflation.
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d differ substantially from each other.The effect of F and x












2.4 The Representative Household: Capital Account Restrictions
Wenowturntothebehaviorofthehouseholdinthescenariowithcapitalcon-
trols.We assume that FF
nc < ,that is,the control is binding.Foreign investors
are not affected, but as soon as Rd falls short to R foreign capital leaves the
country.Ascapitalcontrolsdestroycompletecapitalmobility,theinterestpar-
ityofforeignanddomesticinterestratemightnolongerhold,i.e.,thedomestic
interest rate rd may dissociate itself from r.Hence we have to allow for differ-
ing saving revenuesRd and R.
Furthermore,we now allow for the possibility to circumvent the restriction by
bribes. We denote by b the necessary side payment to a public servant to
weakenthecapitalaccountrestrictionbyoneunit.12Theamountofforeignin-
vestment additional to F,realized by corruption,is labeled x.In this scenario,
the investor has to maximize the following Lagrangean:
(6) Lu cc v WpRD DpRFFb x c pc d =+ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ − − ⋅ (, ) ( ) 12 2 2 1 2 2
ττ
+⋅ + − λ () FxF .
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x =− ⋅ + ≥ ∧ ⋅ = 00 .
We assume ccD F 12 , ,,, λ, and ν to be strictly positive. Note that λ represents
the increase in utility caused by a marginal increase of F,that is,when the re-
strictionisweakenedbyoneunit.From(7)weknowthatv isthemarginalutil-
ity of c1.Hence,fractionλν / represents the shadow price for an increase of F
in terms of the numéraire c1. Due toD> 0, we obtain that discount rate p2 is
equal to 1/Rd (see condition (9)). Then, the marginal willingness to pay for

















Condition (13) tells us that as long as this marginal willingness to pay for cir-
cumventing the restriction,λν / , is higher than bribe b, corruption will occur,








. Notice that arbi-
tragestillforcesRR d −≥ 0.Thehighertheresultingreturndifferentialbetween
inland and abroad will be, the higher the willingness to pay bribes. It is clear
that we have FFxF
lf =+ < (see condition (12)). Therefore, we know that
DWc Fx b =−− − ⋅ + 1 1 () .
12 Axel Dreher and Lars SiemersWe denote the resulting allocation in this capital control scenario by
(, , , , , ) ccSDF xR




or increase compared toD
lf .On the one hand,savings should fall,since aver-
ageinterestrevenuesdecline,sothat SS




cc cc cc =− − + () 1 candeclineaswellas
grow.
The outcome depends on the reaction ofRd, and thus on the level of corrup-























The magnitude of corruption is determined by the interaction of domestic in-
vestorsandpublicservants.Thisissueisanalyzedinthefollowingsubsection.
Before we describe the interaction of corrupt public servants and domestic in-
vestors,we state under which conditions this interaction will occur.First,note
that K f = 0as long as rr d
cc < .Given diminishing marginal productivity of capi-
tal,rr d
cc < is equivalent to KK
lf cc < .Thus,we state:
Proposition 2:
In a capital importing economy,capital control F will only generate corruption
if the size of capital imports,K f
lf ,is smaller than the positive effect of the capital




is given by FF x
lf cc −− .
The proof is given in the appendix. The intuition goes as follows. The capital
control channels domestic capital from abroad to the inland and increases the
supply of capital there.This tends to drop the domestic return on capital.The
arbitrage equilibrium, however, forces that foreign capital leaves the country
to compensate for the excess supply.If the generated excess supply of domes-
tic capital is higher than

K f
lf this compensation becomes impossible: the do-
mestic interest rate falls and the offshore rate of return exceeds the onshore
rate of return.Contrary,if the net effect of the capital control on the domestic
capital market is weak relative to the size of capital imports K f
lf the additional
capital supply at the domestic market can be compensated by a partial capital
flight of foreigners.The domestic interest rate remains at the world level r,the
willingness to pay bribes thereby remains at zero and no corruption arises.
2.5 The Representative Domestic Public Servant13
The established capital restriction FF ≤ requires monitoring by officials.
These public agents may be willing and are in a position to weaken the capital
accountrestrictionifpaidfor.Intheprevioussubsection,wederivedtheinves-
tor’s willingness to pay for circumventing the capital account restriction.This
The Intriguing Nexus between Corruption and Capital Account Restrictions 13was given by the discounted value of the differential between foreign return
on investment R and domestic return on investmentRd.
Monitoring the behavior of the public servants is costly. Given the govern-
ment’s effort to prevent corruption, public servants are subject to investiga-
tionbysomeofficialauthoritywithaparticularprobability.Lettheprobability
of being detected, that a corruptive public servant faces, be p. For simplicity,
this probability is constant for all levels of x.The costs a public servant has to
expect when corruption is proved increases proportionally in the level of cor-
ruptionx,andisgivenbyPx ⋅ ,wherePistheconstantpenaltyvalueperproved
unit x.14 We assume that the public servants know the investor’s willingness to
pay,foralllevelsofx.Inthefollowing,wedenotethewillingnesstopaybyBx () ,
given by[( ) ] / ( ) RRx Rx dd − .It represents the inverse demand function for cor-
ruption.15
Rd is determined by the interaction of the capital supply by investors and the
capitaldemandbydomesticentrepreneurs.ThelowerrestrictionF,thehigher
is the domestic supply of capital.All other things equal,Rd therefore tends to
decline with F. Furthermore, if x increases, the capital supply at the domestic
capital market will, ceteris paribus, decline; as higher corruption levels allow
for higher foreign investment,the marginal willingness to pay bribes declines
in the level of corruption x.Therefore,public servants face an inverse corrup-
tiondemandcurvewithanegativeslopeconcerningcorruptionlevelx(insec-
tion 2.6,we explicitly derive the negative slope ofBx () for a specific example).
Thus,themorecorrupttheyare,thelowerthebribeperunitxtheyobtain;that
is,the lower bribe b.
Given this inverse demand function of the domestic investor,the officials can
act like oligopolists and maximize their expected revenue. For simplicity, we
considerasinglepublicservantwhoactslikeamonopolist.Thedecisionprob-
lem of the representative public servant is described by:
max ( ) ( , )
{} x
pB x F x p Px 1−⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ .
We obtain an Amoroso-Robinson relation:
(14) () ( , ) ( ) , 11 −⋅ ⋅ += ⋅ pB x F p P Bx η
14 Axel Dreher and Lars Siemers
13 The analysis roots in Shleifer/Vishny (1993).It is also broadly related to the tax evasion litera-
ture (e.g.Allingham,Sandmo 1972;Srinivasan 1973).
14 The penalty can be salary shortenings up to dismissal, fines or even imprisonment, but also a
loss of reputation. In practice, of course, these penalty outcomes are uncertain. There are also
some fixed costs for hushing up the crime,but these fixed costs are negligible.
15 The type of corruption we analyze can be classified as “corruption with theft” (following








⋅< 0. This condition
determines the endogenous level of corruption x
cc in the economy, given a
particular level of binding capital account restriction F.The decision problem
is illustrated in Figure 1.
If the capital control becomes stricter, the marginal willingness to pay bribes
will increase. In Figure 1, this means that the willingness to pay curveBxF (, )
shifts outwards so that the intersection point of the marginal revenue curve
()() BxF B xF x ,' , +⋅ and the marginal cost curve pP p ⋅− /( ) 1 moves to the right.
Hence, as long as the capital restriction is binding, the level of corruption de-
creases with the level of F, that is, xx F






< 0. This is de-
picted in Figure 2.Note that the burden of bribes paid by the domestic inves-
tor,bx ⋅ ,definitely increases when the control is stricter.
If there are several public servants competing with each other, the individual
elasticity η will decline;in the extreme,with perfect competition among multi-
ple officials,the elasticity tends to zero and the expected bribe per unit equals
the“expectedunitcosts”.Then,thebribeislowandcorruptionwidespread.In
contrast,the bribes are the highest and the extent of corruption lowest if there
is only one single monopolistic public servant.16
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16 Cf. Shleifer/Vishny (1993) for a similar industrial organization debate of corruption. See also
Andvig/Moene (1990);Cadot (1987).2.6 A Specific Example
Inordertoprovideaspecificexample,weuseaCobb-Douglasutilityfunction:
(15) uc c c c (, )()() 12 1 2 =⋅
α β.
Maximizing (15) subject toWP RS S c
c
R
+− = + 21





































Let us assume that K≥1. Applying KDK f =+ and the domestic capital equi-









16 Axel Dreher and Lars Siemers
























nc, and thus between D
ncand K f
nc, is indetermi-
nate in our setting. However, if K f
nc = 0 the maximum level ofD
nc is1/R and











nc is at its maximum,i.e.at
1/R,thenD











stituting (15) into (6) and applying conditions (7) to (13),one arrives at:
(21) c






















































cc cc =+ .
If we apply the specific production function,the firm’s demand for capital on
the domestic market is given by KR R
D
dd () / =1 .A capital market equilibrium





equilibrium level of the domestic interest rate as a function of the level of cor-
ruption x
cc is implicitly given by:
(26) Rx F










() ( ) ( )
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cc (, ) = , respectively RR d
ττ = , if the level of in-
vestments of foreigners equals

KF x RW f
cc cc =+ + − ⋅ + 1/ /( ) βα β . Due to arbi-



















the required capital supply of foreigners is
negative, that is,RR d < . Hence, only in cases when this condition is fulfilled
there is an incentive to bribe civil servants. In the following we assume that
corruption exists,that is,K f
cc = 0andRR d < .
UsingRr dd
































































































































































0, that is, the
interest rate diminishes if the capital account restriction becomes stricter.The
willingness to pay for one additional unit of foreign investment is given by:










Therefore, the willingness to pay for corruption increases if the restriction























0. This means that the willingness to pay for cor-
ruptiondecreaseswiththesizeofcorruptionx.Hence,thepublicservantfaces
a negative sloped willingness to pay function,as we have assumed in Figures 1
and 2. The public servant chooses the optimal combination of bribe and cor-
ruption by:
(28) max( )

















































=− ⋅ < 2 0.Applying equation (14),the public servant’s opti-















If the government sets the restriction more strictly, the left-hand-side of this
equationincreases.Consequently,fortheequationtohold,thelevelofcorrup-
tion x has to rise in equilibrium. Thus our analysis in section 2.5, concerning
Figures 1 and 2,is supported and we state:
Proposition 3:








Summarizing, the introduction or tightening of capital account restrictions
lowers the domestic interest rate, so that it falls short from the world market























,is strictly positive.Finally,paying bribes to circum-
vent the restriction lowers the interest spread between inland and abroad.
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So far we have demonstrated how investors react on capital account restric-
tions and how a government reacts on corruption,respectively.The agents in-
teract strategically.The interaction between civil servant and domestic house-
holdisasimplegamebetweenamonopolisticcivilservantandmanyinvestors
in perfect competition,like we have described it above.In contrast,the strate-
gic interaction between the investors and the government is more demanding.
The interaction is best described by a sequential game in which the govern-
mentisadominantagentthatmovesfirst.Ourrepresentative,domesticinves-
tor is a reacting second mover. Hence, one has to apply the model of von
Stackelberg (1934).
Solving the game by backward-induction,the government anticipates the do-
mestic investor’s reaction,given by the solution of problem (28).At this point,
we have to distinguish two cases: bounded rationality and unbounded ratio-
nality of the government.It is plausible to assume that a government neglects
the equilibrium effect of its capital control policy on interest rate rd. If this is
thecasethegovernmentisboundedrational.Then,thegovernmentsolvesob-
jective function
() () [] Er D x F r F x F d
cc =⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ + τσ () ( ) () 1
for F, given equation (24) and the solution of (28). If we denote the equilib-
rium level by F
*,the corresponding level of corruption in equilibrium can be
found by substituting F
* into the solution of problem (28).Unfortunately,we
cannot solve the game analytically, because we are only able to derive an im-
plicit solution for the equilibrium rate of interest.
Summarizing, we have demonstrated that the installation of capital controls
may generate incentives for corruption.The stricter the controls,the stronger
corruption will be.Moreover,the model suggests that stronger corruption will
inducestrictercapitalcontrols.Hence,itpredictsamutualrelationship:17capi-
tal account restrictions and corruption reinforce each other.
Our model is simple and partial. For instance, we narrow capital controls on
restricting foreign investment and the analysis is confined to a portfolio deci-
sion.However,capital controls mainly affect investment decisions and aim on
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17 Weanalyzedrestrictionsoncapitaloutflows.Ofcourse,asimilarexerciseispossibleforcapital
imports.In this case,domestic investors would benefit from restrictions on domestic investments
of foreigners, since the domestic interest rate would rise. If capitalists are politically strong, the
government might establish such capital controls; this could also reduce the dependence from
abroadandweakenforeigncompetitorsonproductmarkets.Theriseofthedomesticinterestrate
will bear incentives for foreigners to bribe public servants. The government’s trade-off in estab-
lishing capital controls lies in the fact that the increased interest rate represents higher domestic
costs and corruption.capitaloutflows.Thusthemodelisadequatetohighlightanimportantchannel
as to how capital controls and corruption may interact. In the following, we
empirically test whether the effects identified in Proposition 1 and 3 are con-
firmed by the data.Proposition 2 does not lend itself to measurement.
3. Empirical Estimation of the Relationship between Corruption and
Capital Account Restrictions
To measure corruption, we employ an index provided by the International
Country Risk Guide. This indicator is based on the analysis of a world-wide
network of experts.It is well suited to test the predictions of our model.18
Our indicator of capital account restrictions is constructed with binary data
from the International Monetary Fund’s annual report Exchange Arrange-
mentsandExchangeRestrictions.TheIMFdataarethemostwidelyusedmea-
sures of capital controls and allows an almost universal coverage of countries.
We focus on four forms of restrictions:
– restrictions on payments for capital account transactions,
– separate exchange rate(s) for some or all capital transactions and/or some
or all invisibles,
– surrender requirements for proceeds from exports and/or invisible transac-
tion and
– restrictions for payments on current transactions.
While the first three restrictions can broadly be interpreted as a form of con-
trolsoncapital,thefourthrestrictionhasbeenincludedbecausecurrenttrans-
actions can be used to circumvent restrictions on the capital account
(Milesi-Ferretti 1998:225).19
Our index of restrictions aggregates the four measures. Therefore, the index
takesthevalueof4forfullyrestrictedcapitalaccounts,and0,ifnorestrictions
are in place.20 As an obvious shortcoming with this approach, our index does
neithermeasuretheintensitynortheeffectivenessofcontrols.Onewouldalso
like to distinguish between controls on inflows of capital and those on out-
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18 Note that the focus of this index is on capturing political risk involved in corruption.Since it is
the only perception-based data on corruption providing consistent time series,the index has nev-
ertheless been widely used in empirical studies.
19 In 1997 the IMF changed the format of its survey.Following Glick/Hutchison (2005) we coded
“restrictions on payments for capital account transactions”to be unity if controls were in place in
5ormoreofthesub-categoriesofcapitalaccountrestrictions,and“financialcredit”wasoneofthe
categories restricted.
20 Asimilarprocedurehasbeenemployed,e.g.,byGruben/McLeod(2001)andBai/Wei(2001).flows. We do, however, neither have the data to adequately control for inten-
sity and effectiveness,21 nor those for an analysis of inflows and outflows.
To assess the relationship between corruption and capital account restrictions
empirically, we use a panel of 112 countries. Our data cover the years
1984–2002.We employ averages over three years for all variables.This makes
the indices of corruption and capital account restrictions continuous with val-
ues ranging between 0 (no corruption) and 6 (high corruption) and, respec-
tively,0(notrestricted)and4(fullyrestricted).Bymakingthedependentvari-
ables less discrete,we can use linear estimation methods.Some of the data are
not available for all countries or every year.Therefore,our panel data are un-
balanced and the number of observations depends on the choice of explana-
tory variables. All variables, their precise definitions and data sources are
listed in the appendix.
3.1 Determinants of Corruption
Table 1 shows the estimates of the effect of capital account restrictions on cor-
ruption. Estimation is by OLS. To account for time-invariant unobservable
heterogeneity potentially correlated with the regressor,we use a fixed effects
specification. Therefore, we could not include variables that do not change
over time.We also tested for fixed time effects but found them to be insignifi-
cant.
Column (1) contains results from a regression of the index of corruption on
the index of capital account restrictions.As can be seen,without the relevant
control variables,the coefficient is completely insignificant.In the further col-
umns of Table 1,we add control variables to account for time-varying observ-
able heterogeneity.Following Lederman et al.(2001),we test for the influence
of four groups of control variables.
First,corruption is probably influenced by the political system.We include an
indexofdemocracyandanindexforthecompetitivenessofnominatingcandi-
dates for the legislature to proxy the degree of political competition. We hy-
pothesize corruption to be lower in more democratic and more competitive
countries. Indices measuring legislature fractionalization of the government
and,respectively,the opposition are also included.We expect corruption to be
lowerwhenthegovernmentconsistsofmoreparties.Theeffectofafractional-
ized opposition is less clear. On the one hand, high fractionalization could
proxy high competition.On the other hand,it could indicate weak opposition.
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21 To proxy the intensity or effectiveness of capital controls, black market premiums, on-
shore-offshore interest differentials and deviations from covered interest parity have been em-
ployed (e.g.Giavazzi,Pagano 1988;Dooley,Isard 1980).However,those variables measure other
aspectsaswell.Wefocusontheexistenceratherthanthedegreeofcontrolsanddonotusethem.Since transparency increases the accountability of politicians,an index for the
freedom of the press is included.We also add a dummy which takes the value
ofoneiftheIMFclassifiestheexchangerateoftherespectivecountryasfixed,
and zero otherwise.
Second,corruption is likely to depend on cultural factors.Variables related to
regional, ethnical and religious characteristics of a country might be impor-
tant.Since most of those variables do,however,not vary over time,we can not
includetheminafixedeffectsspecification.Ourcountrydummiesaccountfor
them.Therefore,the only variable we employ is the share of Protestants in the
population which shows some variation over time.
Third,variablesmeasuringgovernments’policiesareemployed.Totalgovern-
mentrevenueasashareofGDPisusedtoquantifythesizeofthegovernment
and therefore the size of the rents available for extraction. Corruption has
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Fixed exchange rate (dummy) –0.061
(–0.56)
Share of protestants 0.084
(1.47)
Government revenue





ln(gdp per capita) 0.069
(0.30)






Number of observations 716 411 513 471 444 449
R2 0.131 0.409 0.162 0.380 0.139 0.157
Thecoefficientsofthecountrydummiesarenotreported.–t-statisticsinparentheses:*Significant
at the 1 percent level. – **Significant at the 5 percent level. – aSignificant at the 10 percent level.
All variables are averages over three years.
Table 1been shown to decrease with economic openness (Ades, di Tella 1994). We
therefore include a country’s exports and imports relative to GDP.
Fourth,weincludevariablestoaccountforthedegreeofdevelopment.Weex-
pect corruption to be lower in countries with a higher GDP per capita and
lower rates of illiteracy.
The groups of variables are included one at a time in addition to the variables
that are significant at the ten percent level at least.Column (2) adds the politi-
calvariables,whiletheculturalvariableisincludedincolumn(3).Columns(4)
and (5) include the variables accounting for policy and development, respec-
tively.Finally,column (6) combines all previously significant variables.
Ascanbeseen,mostofourcovariatesareinsignificant.Theexceptionsarede-
mocracy,freedom of the press,and the illiteracy rate.It turns out that democ-
racy and a free press reduce corruption at the one percent level in the regres-
sion of column (2).In the final equation of column (6),only democracy,how-
ever, keeps its significant coefficient. At the ten percent level, illiteracy in-
creases corruption.
Turning to the results for capital account restrictions,the table shows that the
significance of the coefficient depends on the specification of the regression.
Inthefinalequationofcolumn(6),thecoefficientissignificantatthefiveper-
cent level,with the expected positive sign.The coefficient isquantitatively rel-
evant.Areductionintheintensityofcontrolsbyonepoint(i.e.theabolitionof
one restriction) leads to a decrease in corruption by 0.1 points.This has been,
e.g., the difference in the index of corruption between Australia and Switzer-
land,or between Austria and Portugal over the period 1999–2002.
3.2 Determinants of Capital Account Restrictions
Table 2 uses the index of capital account restrictions as dependent variable.
Again, our focus is on the relation between restrictions and corruption. We
tested for fixed time and country effects and found them to be significant.
Column (1) shows the result of the regression of the index of restrictions on
the index of corruption. However, its coefficient is not significant at conven-
tional levels.
As covariates, we employ variables usually included in regressions trying to
explain restrictions on the capital account. We focus on three groups of vari-
ables. The first group contains variables accounting for the political system,
and political as well as economic crises. We include a variable measuring the
degree of democracy. The median voter is probably supportive of capital ac-
count restrictions. On the other hand, authoritarian leaders tend to support
theinterestsofinwardlookingsectors(Bruneetal.2001).Theinfluenceofde-
24 Axel Dreher and Lars Siemersmocracy on restrictions is thus not obvious a priori.We also include a dummy
which is one if a country’s government is left-wing and zero otherwise. Since
left-wing governments are traditionally closer to labor,we expect them to re-
strict the capital account more frequently than more conservative govern-
ments do.
In order to prevent capital flight, unstable governments are also likely to im-
pose more restrictions (Milesi-Ferretti 1998:230).We thus include an index of
political stability (Dreher 2005).22 Capital controls are also frequently intro-
duced during banking or currency crises. We therefore include variables ac-
counting for those crises.23
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Determinants of Capital Account Restrictions
panel data,112 countries,1984–2002























































Gross domestic savings 0.012
(1.33)
Number of observations 716 438 509 422 422
R2 0.154 0.406 0.387 0.373 0.368
The coefficients of the country and time dummies are not reported. – t-statistics in parentheses:
*Significantatthe1percentlevel.–**Significantatthe5percentlevel.– aSignificantatthe10per-
cent level.All variables are averages over three years.
Table 2
22 Theindexisconstructedusingprincipalcomponentsanalysis.Itemploysthefollowingcatego-
ries:assassinations,strikes,guerrilla warfare,government crisis,riots and revolutions.Since those
variables are highly collinear,they should not be included all separately in one regression.
23 Cukierman et al.(1992) suggested the turnover rate of central bankers to measure the central
bank’s degree of independence.With independent central banks,governments have no influenceWe also include variables measuring the degree of development suggested by
Brune et al. (2001). We expect the capital account to be less restricted with
higher GDP per capita.This is because higher per capita GDP is usually asso-
ciatedwithbetterdevelopedfinancialinstitutions.Thosecountriesare,inturn,
morelikelytoreapbenefitsfromopencapitalaccounts.Thenaturallogarithm
of a country’s population is included to control for its size. Smaller countries
derive more benefits from integration and are therefore more likely to have
open capital accounts.
Moreover, capital account restrictions might be affected by economic vari-
ables. We expect a country’s capital account to be more restricted, the higher
its rate of monetary expansion.This is because capital flight is more attractive
with higher money growth,since the interest rates tend to diminish.Countries
with lower rates of economic growth might feel the need to liberalize in order
to attract foreign capital.The influence of a country’s openness is,a priori,not
obvious (Milesi-Ferretti 1998). On the one hand, countries with a large trade
balance (relative to GDP) are more heavily exposed to external shocks which
provide incentives to impose restriction on capital flows.24 On the other hand,
it is more difficult to monitor capital flows in open economies.Countries with
low domestic savings require more foreign capital. They are therefore less
likely to restrict capital flows.
In column (2),we include our political variables.It turns out that more social-
ist governments tend to introduce or maintain restrictions on the capital ac-
count significantly more frequently. Restrictions are also significantly more
likely at the time of banking crises.The index of corruption is now significant
at the ten percent level and has the expected sign.Capital account restrictions
are not influenced by democracy,currency crises and political instability.
In addition to the significant covariates,columns (3) and (4) include variables
accountingforacountry’slevelofdevelopmentand,respectively,government
policies.HigherpercapitaGDP,agreaterpopulation,highermonetarygrowth
and less GDP growth lead to more restrictions, while openness to trade and
gross domestic savings have no effect.The index of corruption is significant at
the ten and five percent level,respectively,with the expected sign.
Finally,in column (5),we combine all variables which have been significant in
one of the previous regressions. While most of the results remain, left-wing
governments and banking crises no longer influence restrictions.The index of
corruption is again significant at the five percent level. Its coefficient shows
26 Axel Dreher and Lars Siemers
onmonetarypolicywhichreducesincentivestoimplementcapitalaccountrestrictions.Wedonot
include this variable because it reduces our number of observations substantially.
24 For instance, capital flows may destabilize an economy by increasing the risk of widespread
bank failures.that an increase in corruption by one point leads to 0.13 points more restric-
tions on the capital account.
To sum up, there is evidence that corruption and capital account restrictions
are correlated.If we assume restrictions to be exogenous determinants of cor-
ruption, the results show that restrictions increase corruption. Similarly, if
taken as exogenous, corruption leads to more restrictions on the capital ac-
count.However,if our model is correct,assuming corruption and restrictions
to be exogenous determinants of each other is flawed (and estimation by OLS
is biased and inconsistent). This objection is supported by our empirical re-
sults. We therefore proceed with determining (Granger-)causality between
the two variables.
3.3 (Granger-)Causality and Joint Determination of Corruption and Capital Account
Restrictions
The analysis has shown that capital account restrictions significantly affect
corruption while, in turn, restrictions are significantly influenced by corrup-
tion. If there is, however, a mutual relationship like the one predicted by our
model,the ordinary least squares technique applied above yields inconsistent
estimates of the parameters and our equations had to be estimated simulta-
neously. To determine the direction of the causal relationship we use a dy-
namic model.Causality is defined in the sense of Granger (1969).That means
thatavariablexiscausingavariableyifpastvaluesofxhelptoexplainy,once
the past influence of y has been accounted for.
IfwehaveNcross-sectionalunitsobservedoverTtimeperiods,themodelis:




,, , , =++ + −− = = ∑ ∑ αβ α 1 1 ,
where iN =1,..., and tT =1,..., . The parameters are denoted α j and β j, the
maximal lag length is m i ,α represents unobserved individual effects anduit is
an independently and identically distributed stochastic error.
Since the regressions include lagged dependent variables and individual ef-
fects,estimation with OLS generates biased coefficients.Moreover,in a short
panel the within groups estimator is inconsistent in the presence of endoge-
nous variables (Nickell 1981). We therefore apply the GMM estimator of
Arellano/Bond (1991). This estimator consists in first-differencing the esti-
matingequationandusinglagsofthedependentvariablefromatleasttwope-
riods earlier as well as lags of the right-hand side variables as instruments.
Sincetherearemoreinstrumentsthanright-handsidevariables,theequations
are over-identified and instruments must be weighted in an appropriate way.
We only present results from the Arellano-Bond one-step GMM estimator,
which uses the identity matrix as a weighting matrix.The two-step GMM esti-
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timates. However, in small samples like the one used here, standard errors
tend to be under-estimated by the two-step estimator (Arellano, Bond 1991:
291).
Table 3 presents the results.The null hypothesis that corruption has no effect
on capital account restrictions can be rejected for lag length one and two. As
can be seen, the same is true if we use corruption as the dependent variable
and test for the influence of restrictions. Table 4 proceeds by estimating cor-
ruptionandcapitalaccountrestrictionssimultaneously,whichamountstoadi-
rect test of our theoretical model.We employ two-stage least squares (2SLS).
2SLS allows for the inclusion of endogenous regressors that are dependent
variables from other equations in the system.The regressions focus on the fi-
nal specifications of Tables 1 and 2.
AscanbeseeninTable4,restrictionsonthecapitalaccountbreedcorruption,
whereascorruptionleadstomorerestrictions.Bothcoefficientsaresignificant
at the one percent level. Compared to the individual estimations, the coeffi-
cients show a considerably stronger impact. A reduction in the intensity of
controls by one point (i.e.the abolition of one restriction) leads to a decrease
in corruption by 0.4 points. An increase in corruption by one point leads to
3.66 points more restrictions on the capital account.We test the robustness of
these results in the next section.
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t–1 –0.41* 0.23 –0.07 t–1 0.31* 0.11 0.09
t–2 –0.89** –0.10 t–2 0.09 0.06
t–3 0.15 t–3 0.15
Corruption Restrictions
t–1 –1.02* –0.92* –0.95* t–1 –0.65* –0.76* –0.65*
t–2 0.31* 0.26** t–2 0.17** 0.16**
t–3 –0.31** t–3 –0.12
p-value for (joint) significance of
restrictions 0.00 0.03 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00
corruption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.13
t-statistics in parentheses:*Significant at the 1 percent level.– **Significant at the 5 percent level.
All variables are averages over three years.
Table 33.4 Robustness Analysis25
We test for the robustness of the simultaneous regression of corruption and
capital account restrictions reported in Table 4. First, we check for the influ-
ence of outliers using an algorithm that is robust to them.The algorithm mini-
mizes the median (rather than the mean) of the residuals.26 However,fixed ef-
fectscannotbeincludedintheseregressions.Itturnsoutthatourresultsarein
part influenced by outlying observations:in the median regression,corruption
no longer significantly influences restrictions.At the one percent level of sig-
nificance,however,restrictions increase corruption.
As one obvious problem,our index of corruption is bounded between 0 and 6;
the index of capital account restrictions is bounded between 0 and 4. Since
OLS assumes that the dependent variable is unbounded, our second test for
thestabilityoftheresultsconsistsinre-estimatingourregressionwithbothin-
dices transformed to unbounded variables. This transformation is usually
done by taking the natural logarithm of xx x /( )
max − ,where x is the variable to
be transformed and x
max is its maximum value. To avoid generating missing
values,we redefine x as being equal to 10–9 in years where no restrictions have
been in place or, respectively, 4–10–9 when the capital account has been fully
restricted. We apply the same transformation to the index of corruption. The
results show, that the transformation does again alter our main conclusions.
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Determinants of Corruption and Capital Account Restrictions
panel data,71 countries,1984–2002,2SLS
Dependent variable:corruption Dependent variable:capital account restrictions













people ages 15 and above)
-0.002
(0.20)








Number of observations 364 364
R2 0.70 0.20
The coefficients of the country and time dummies are not reported. – t-statistics in parentheses:
*Significantatthe1percentlevel.–**Significantatthe5percentlevel.– aSignificantatthe10per-
cent level.All variables are averages over three years.
Table 4
25 Detailed results are available upon request.
26 Least absolute value = min | |.
bi ii median y x b −Whereas the significant impact of corruption on restrictions remains, corrup-
tion is no longer significantly influenced by restrictions.
Third,we employ an alternative index of corruption.This index has been con-
structedbyTransparencyInternational(TransparencyInternational2003)and
ranges from 0 (no corruption) to 10 (high corruption).27 Restrictions on the
capital account significantly increase corruption as measured by this index.
Again,corruption has no significant impact.
4. Conclusions
In a theoretical model we analyzed the interaction between government and
investors,and the interaction of investors and civil servants.We demonstrated
the existence of a nexus between corruption and capital account restrictions:
whileahigherlevelofcorruptionleadstostricterrestrictions,astricterlevelof
restrictions leads to more corruption. Thus, corruption and restrictions rein-
force each other mutually.
Using a panel of 121 countries,we tested this hypothesis and actually found a
significantmutualrelationship.Corruptionandcapitalaccountrestrictionsin-
fluence each other simultaneously. Our results show that corruption leads to
more restrictions on the capital account,while restrictions,in turn,breed cor-
ruption.However,our tests also show that these results are not completely ro-
bust regarding the method of estimation,the underlying sample,the choice of
corruption index,and inclusion of explanatory variables.
Governments that hope to increase their capital tax revenue by the introduc-
tion of controls often neglect the negative equilibrium effect of increased cor-
ruption and evasion. Therefore, before introducing or tightening controls on
capital, the pros and cons of such policy must be weighed carefully. Often in-
vestors and civil servants only need a few months to find ways to circumvent
new restrictions. The net effect on tax revenues may thus well turn out to be
small,andmayevenbeovercompensatedbythenegativeeffectsofhighercor-
ruption. Furthermore, our paper suggests that a country that follows such a
policy may experience a vicious circle in the sense that corruption causes
strictercontrols,therebyincreasingthelevelofcorruption,whichagaincauses
stricter controls,and so on.
The same holds in the context of the debate about introducing tighter capital
controls in the Western World to fight the “negative”effects of globalization.
Even if controls can mitigate volatility and risk of crises (which many econo-
mistsdoubt),theymayproducemoreharmthangoodascontrolsincreasecor-
ruption.
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27 Thisindexisavailablefordifferenttimeperiods,butisanaggregateofdifferentsurveysatdif-
ferent points in time.As the rankings of the index are thus not directly comparable over time,we
do not report the results in a table.References
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2:
In the capital control scenario,RR d = requires KK
cc lf = .The latter,in turn,is







lf −=− . Due to arbitrage it is clear that each in-
crease in KK d
cc
d
lf − ,caused by the capital control,will be compensated by a de-
crease of K f
cc,so thatRR d = remains.However,reaching K f
cc = 0this becomes
impossibleandthedomesticreturnRd fallsshorttoRR R d : < .Thecorrespond-







lf =− ,because more than a complete capital flight
of the foreign capital cannot occur.We know that KDW cF x d
cc cc cc cc == − − − 1
and KDW cF d
lf lf lf lf == − − 1 .Thus:
() ()

Kc c F F x f
lf lf cc lf cc =−+− − 11
As long as RR d = there is no effect on the present value of income or on the
intertemporal price, that is, cc
lf cc
11 = . Therefore, we obtain

KFF x f
lf lf cc =− −
(q.e.d.).
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Range 0 (no restrictions) to 4 (fully restricted).
index of democracy Marshall,Jaggers
(2000)
Measures the general openness of political institu-
tions (0 = low,10 = high democracy score).
Government
fractionalization
Beck et al.(2001) The probability that two deputies picked at ran-






The probability that two deputies picked at ran-




Banks (2002) Index:(3) Competitive,(2) Partly Competitive,(1)
Essentially Non-Competitive,(0) No Legislature





Fixed exchange rate IMF,various years Dummy is equal to zero if a currency is freely fluc-
tuating,and 1 otherwise.
Share of protestants Treisman (2000),
CIA (2002)
Protestant population in percent
Openness World Bank (2002) The sum of exports and imports of goods and ser-
vices measured as a share of GDP.
Government revenue World Bank (2002) General government final consumption expendi-
ture in percent of GDP.
ln(gdp per capita) World Bank (2002) GDP divided by midyear population (in constant
1995 US$).
Illiteracy rate (% of people
ages 15 and above)
World Bank (2002) The percentage of people ages 15 and above who
cannot,with understanding,read and write a short,
simple statement on their everyday life.
Socialist governments Beck et al.(2001) Chief Executive's party is defined as communist,
socialist,social democratic,or left-wing.
Political instability Dreher (2005) Index constructed with principal components anal-
ysis.The weights obtained for the components are
0.08 (assassination),0.1 (strikes),0.25 (guerrilla









Dummy takes value of one if a crisis occurred that
year,zero otherwise.
Monetary growth World Bank (2002) Money and quasi money growth (annual %).
Gross domestic savings World Bank (2002) Gross domestic savings are calculated as GDP less
final consumption expenditure.
ln(population) World Bank (2002) All residents regardless of legal status or citizen-
ship.
GDP growth World Bank (2002) Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market
prices based on constant local currency.Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics
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Variable Mean Std.Dev.(overall)
Corruption 3.38 1.40
Capital account restrictions 2.01 1.35
Index of democracy 5.17 4.16
Government fractionalization 0.20 0.27
Opposition fractionalization 0.47 0.29
Competitive nomination 1.41 0.64
Free press 42.77 32.93
Fixed exchange rate 0.60 0.46
Share of protestants 0.57 3.15
Openness 74.52 49.67
Government revenue 25.00 10.99
ln(gdp per capita) 7.82 1.59
Illiteracy rate (% of people ages 15 and above) 26.54 22.40
Socialist governments 0.31 0.45
Political instability 0.21 0.37
Banking crises 0.21 0.36
Currency crises 0.13 0.24
Monetary growth 62.27 383.83
Gross domestic savings 18.69 11.64
ln(population) 16.02 1.66
GDP growth 2.96 3.83